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Fall 2009

The Endangered Future of Mfordable
Housing Exactions
by Roger Bernhardt, Professor of Law, Golden Gate University, San Francicso, CA &
David Callies, Kudo Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, Honolulu, HI
Roger Bernhardt begins: If the enforce-

ability of local exactions imposed by communities on developers to promote affordable housing in their environs interests you, then do read
the decision in Building Industry Association v
City of Patterson, 171 Cal App 41h 886, given
its entertaining facts, its complicated logic, and
its ominous implications for this cause. The
decision was rendered by a Court of Appeal
in March, and in June, the California Supreme
Court denied review and refused to de-publish
it.
As for the facts, in 2003 a developer and
a city signed a development agreement for the
construction of 214 residential housing units.
The agreement called for the developer to pay
an affordable housing in lieu fee of $734 per
unit - or more as determined by a "revised fee
schedule, including indexing as provided by
ordinance at the time of the adoption of the fee,
providing the same is reasonably justified".
The affordable housing fee had originally been set at $319 per unit in 1995, but had
been increased to $734 in 2001, based upon
a "leverage" study that assumed that the city
would only need to itself cover 9% of the cost
of subsidizing affordability. But then, a second
study, in 2005, went off the rails: it concluded
that, based upon a "needs assessment" of all of
Stanislaus County, the City of Patterson needed
to develop 642 units of affordable housing
- which would cost a total of $73.5 million!
Since there were only 3500 "unentitled" residentiallots yet available in the city, the price of
subsidizing each affordable unit would require
imposing a charge of $20,946 on each of
those undeveloped lots, not $743, as originally
thought. So the fee was increased from $743 to
$20,946 on each of the developers 214 lots.

A trial court found that the City's "methodology" was reasonable, and upheld it, but the
Court of Appeal reversed that decision, and
invalidated the new fee. Its opinion went out
of its way to avoid taking any easy way out.
The court declined to hold that the developer
had any vested rights to the earlier, lower fee,
given the specific language of the development
agreement. It also held that under the development agreement, the City was free to charge
any new fee that was "reasonably justified", and
was not required to abide by the earlier leverage
formula it had used in originally calculating that
fee. Nor could the developer get itselfprotected
by a heightened constitutional scrutiny theory
a la NollanlDolan; based on the California
Supreme Court decision of San Remo Hotel v
San Francisco, 27 Cal 4th 643, 2002, the City of
Patterson was only required to show "a reasonable relationship between the amount of the fee,
as increased, and the 'deleterious public impact
of the development.'"
Using that kind of test, the court "located nothing that demonstrates or implies the
increased fee was reasonably related to the need
for affordable housing associated with the project." .... No connection is shown ... between this
642 figure and the need for affordable housing
associated with new market rate development."
Since the city failed to demonstrate any reasonable relationship between the new fee and any
deleterious impact connected to the project, it
was invalid
Technically, one can read this decision
as holding merely that the city's interpretation of
a development agreement that it executed with
a developer was incorrect, but I took it to say
that a town's entire affordable housing impact
fee-whether imposed by way of a developcontinued on page 8
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ment agreement or by an across-the-board ordinance—might not pass constitutional muster.
To get an outside perspective on this
case, I turned to David L. Callies, the Kudo
Professor of Law at the University of Hawaii’s
William S. Richardson School of Law. Given
his credentials, it made more sense for me to ask
the questions and have him give the answers.
So, David, what is your reading of Patterson?
David Callies: The latter. Moreover, it
seems to me the reasoning of the case applies
not only to housing set-asides/fees/exactions,
but all land development conditions/in lieu/
mitigation fees. Although Nollan/Dolan intermediate scrutiny may not apply, the court is
clearly requiring some demonstrable connection
between a problem caused by the development/
developer and the fee/set-aside.
RB: But isn’t there the notion that
across-the-board, wide-ranging impositions,
especially those legislatively enacted, should
survive judicial scrutiny more successfully than
individualized, adjudicative decisions that come
out of appointees in agencies? If that applies
here, might Patterson be better able to do by
ordinance what it could not get away with in a
development agreement?
DC: True, if legislatively enacted according to the California Supreme Court in Ehrlich
v Culver City (1996) 12 C4th 854, 50 CR2d
242, though I admit to the same puzzlement
as Justice Thomas in his dissent from the U.S.
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Parking
Ass’n of Georgia v City of Atlanta (1995) 515
US 1116, 1117, 132 L Ed 2d 273, 274, 115 S Ct
2268: Certainly, legislative bodies can impose
conditions that are just as unconstitutional as
those imposed by administrative agencies. The
rest of the California Supreme Court’s Ehrlich
decision is a stark example of what results from
the mindless application of legislative defer-

ence: upholding the levying of a public art fee
on the developer of a small condominium complex, without any attempt to link that development with a presumably public desire for public
art. How does any private development even
remotely drive a need for art?
RB: Getting to the merits of the fee
formula itself, the opinion’s requirement that
the city demonstrate a “reasonable relationship
between the amount of the fee, as increased,”
and the “deleterious public impact of the development” looks like it might be a possibly insurmountable hurdle. What do you think of the
idea of calculating the housing fee by 1) starting
with an estimate of the countywide need for
affordable housing, 2) allocating 642 affordable
housing units to this town, 3) estimating each
unit to require a subsidy of $55,000-$165,000
(for moderate or low income householders),
for a total of $73.5 million; and then 4) spreading out that total subsidy cost among the 3500
remaining unbuilt lots in the town, in order 5)
to get to a fee of $21,000 on each new building
permit? Do you think that will ever be upheld as
a legitimate way to start?
DC: We don’t get to proportionality if
there is no nexus. However, even if one gets past
nexus, the suggested calculation above places
the entire burden for affordable housing on new
development—which, I suspect, will not pass
even a watered-down version of a proportionality test. Thus, for example, why should all
unbuilt units pay an identical impact fee? Why
shouldn’t the city pay a substantial portion of
the cost of affordable housing, once the fee has
been separated from the need for lack of nexus?
Note that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
was impressed by the City of Sacramento’s
willingness to pay half the cost of the affordable
housing need generated by the proposed hotel
(according to the city’s studies) in Commercial
Builders of N. Cal. v City of Sacramento (9th
Cir 1991) 941 F2d 872.
continued on page 9
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RB: So are you saying that you think a
court (or this court) is saying that there is no
nexus, or the nexus logic in this case didn’t
work?
DC: The latter. The court found no
demonstrable relationship between the housing
fee and the public impact of the contemplated/
proposed residential development. Therefore,
considering proportionality—the size of the
fee—in this circumstance is moot.
RB. Let’s look at some of the particular
components of the fee formula themselves.
How does a proactive community justifiably
estimate its local need for affordable housing?
Can it just accept the number given to it by its
county or regional government agency? If there
is no such higher authority to give it a number,
is there a way for it calculate its own number?
Would it have to make a census of its residents
and then derive the shortfall mathematically by
comparing the median income of its residents
with the median cost of its housing? Given the
emphasis on regional housing needs, wouldn’t
the city also have to look at the economic situation of the outsiders who might like to move
into town but cannot afford to do so?
DC: The issue is not the community’s
need, but the legality/constitutionality of the
mechanism that it chooses to use to attempt
to meet that need. Extracting (some would say
extorting) the housing necessary to satisfy that
need from a housing provider of more expensive
housing is a tax, pure and simple: It is a means
of raising revenue or its equivalent. Impact fees,
exactions, and dedications, on the other hand,
represent exercises of the police power, not the
power to tax and raise revenues. The city is entitled to meet those “needs” through land development fees and exactions only if those “needs”
are generated by the proposed development. If
the development is commercial, then depending
on the nature of that commercial use, the Ninth

Circuit’s City of Sacramento decision methodology would be apt: Do a study that determines
the number of low-income employment opportunities generated by the development and the
shortage of available affordable housing to
meet that development-generated need, and then
assess the commercial development a share of
the cost incurred to meet that need.
RB: Assuming that it comes up with a
formula that works, how does a community that
does create some affordable housing allocate
it? Since it clearly can’t reduce housing costs
across the board for everybody, how does it
decide who the winners are, i.e. those who get
to move in to the new units? Auctions probably
would be self-defeating, so should it to go lotteries or waiting lists? And who should be in
the pool of eligible winners; can only existing
residents get on the list?
DC: The mechanism simply needs to be
fair; going beyond residents, however, abandons
any pretense of justification based on community need. Since community need is the only basis
for levying such a fee in the first place, only
residents should be counted in determining that
need. Lotteries are pretty random methods for
determining who is entitled to a limited amount
of affordable housing. Better to use waiting lists
with each resident’s position on it based upon a
combination of factors like current income and
family size.
RB: The biggest issue for me is: How
can a city ever show a “deleterious public
impact” from a housing development that creates a need for affordable housing? I can see the
linkage between industrial or commercial developments and affordable housing, but where is
there any nexus when the new development is
residential instead? Do the new middle-class
homeowners moving in need to have their maids
and gardeners not have to commute from too far
away? (And in that case, a better solution might
continued on page 10
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be larger houses with servants’ quarters rather
than lower priced housing somewhere else.)
DC: That’s the point: The city can’t
show a deleterious impact on affordable housing resulting from a residential development.There isn’t any. I think these mechanisms won’t
hold up in court anywhere, and following the
Patterson decision and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lingle v Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (2005)
544 US 528, 161 L Ed 2d 876, 125 S Ct 2074,
I don’t think they’re constitutional in California
either.
RB: Might these issues be any easier
with a different formula? Might an inclusionary
zoning ordinance that just requires developers
to set aside of some percentage of units for low
or moderate income housing more safely survive the Patterson standard?
DC: Inclusionary zoning in the context
you suggest is both illusory and misplaced.-The
concept was originally used against recalcitrant local governments (as in the New Jersey
Mt. Laurel litigation (South Burlington County
NAACP v Mount Laurel (NJ 1975) 336 A2d
713)) that failed to provide for a fair share of
affordable housing by, among other things,
zoning only for middle to high-end housing. To
turn it on its head and apply it to a landowner
developer is flawed from the beginning.

for what they are: revenue-raising measures (as
opposed to police power exercises) with no connection to the residential project to which they
are applied.
In sum, the Patterson case requires
some reasonable connection between a land
development fee or exaction of any kind and
a need that the “charged” developer causes by
reason of its development. Gone are the days
when a California local government could
require the payment of such fees and exactions simply because local government had a
need and the developer needed a development
permit. Certainly, this is a fair result. No one
is quarrelling with the public need. The issue
is—and always has been—who pays, and on
what basis.
***

RB: Could affordability be brought
about by a tax instead, say, an excise tax on the
privilege of developing land? That would be
harder in California, because of Proposition 13,
but since the town’s residents (those who vote)
already live in completed houses that would not
be subject to the tax, its financial burden would
fall only on the owners of undeveloped land,
who probably don’t vote.

RB. Before we finished polishing the
comments above, another decision came down
that we thought ought to be tied in to them. On
July 22, a different court of appeal rendered its
decision in Palmer/Sixth Street v City of Los
Angeles, 175 Cal.App.4th 1396. What had happened there was that in 1991 the city of Los
Angeles had adopted a specific plan for the
preservation of the low income characteristics
of one of its neighborhoods, requiring that the
demolition of any low income housing there had
to be offset by construction of new affordable
housing either subject to rent control or else by
payment of an in lieu fee of $80000-$100000
for each unit so lost. This 60 unit building had
been torn down in 1990, but the City’s specific
plan reached back to 1988, leading it to include
in the conditional use permit it issued for the
developer’s new 350 unit project that it create
60 replacement low income rental units or pay
an in lieu fee oh $5.8 million.

DC: Sure, a tax would solve all the legal
problems.-It recognizes such housing exactions

Both the trial court and appellate court
held that the city’s demand violated the vacancy
continued on page 11
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decontrol requirement of the California Costa
Hawkins Act, which declares that residential
landlords may “establish the initial and all subsequent rental rates” for their dwelling units.
The City’s requirement that 60 of the new units
be let at affordable rates was therefore in violation of and preempted by the statute. The in lieu
fee alternative, although not mentioned in the
Costa Hawkins act, was so intertwined as to
be also preempted. That meant, of course, that
the city of Los Angeles would be no more successful at mandating affordability through rent
control measures that the city of Patterson had
been in achieving affordable pricing.
This is technically a rent control decision rather than a land-use exaction one, and
will not be too informative to residents of other
jurisdictions that lack local rent control ordinances or statewide preemption of it. But the
court’s holding that a city’s demand on a developer to replace 60 units of low income housing
that had been demolished in a particular neighborhood ran afoul of a statutory vacancy decontrol mandate seemed to me to demonstrate a
kind of willingness to stretch out to prohibit
a local government from overreaching. After
all, this was not a classic citywide rent control
ordinance but rather a conditional use permit
applicable only in special circumstances. Do
you agree David?
DC: Well, sort of. The circumstances
are sufficiently odd that it is difficult for me to
draw any generally-applicable conclusions.
RB: When this holding is combined
with Patterson, the future of affordable mandates seen even bleaker. Patterson prohibited
a city from mandating affordable sale prices,
and now this case prohibits it from mandating
affordable rental prices. Is there anything left?

really does generate a need for nearby affordable/workforce housing, just like the 9th Circuit
held in the City of Sacramento case way back
in 1991. It’s still all about nexus and proportionality.
RB: Well, this case does illustrate a
situation where the nexus that was missing in
Patterson might be found. You and I feared that
a local government might never be able to satisfy a court of the need to charge a developer for
affordable housing that it wanted to see built,
but perhaps it could make such a demand when
that developer began the project by demolishing some affordable housing that was already
there?
DC: Your fear, Roger, not mine. I never
did buy the city’s notion as accepted by the
California Court of Appeals in the Culver City
case that a socially useful or desirable private
facility like a sports club (or, for that matter, an
inexpensive dwelling) becomes affected with
or coupled to a governmental/public interest
to which government can attach replacement
conditions to a demolition or change-of-use
permit. If government wants, or the public
needs (not necessarily the same thing…) low
income, affordable, workforce housing then
it can either (1) build it (2) subsidize it or (3)
provide incentives to the private development
sector, such as the obviously popular density
bonus which California authorizes by statute,
and which, according to a recent study by a
housing nonprofit, is successfully used by 90%
of the local government respondents, according
to its 2004-2005 surveys.
RB. Oh, well. If that’s all it requires…

DC: Sure: mandatory set-asides on
commercial and industrial development that
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